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MORAL SCEPTICISM AND AGENCY: KANT AND KORSGAARD 
 
Robert Stern 
 
Abstract 
One argument put forward by Christine Korsgaard in favour of her constructivist appeal 
to the nature of agency, is that it does better than moral realism in answering moral 
scepticism. However, realists have replied by pressing on her the worry raised by H. A. 
Prichard, that any attempt to answer the moral sceptic only succeeds in basing moral 
actions in non-moral ends, and so it self-defeating. I spell out these issues in more detail, 
and suggest that both sides can learn something by seeing how the sceptical problematic 
arises in Kant. Doing so, I argue, shows how Korsgaard might raise the issue of 
scepticism against the realist whilst avoiding the Prichardian response. 
 
This paper is about moral scepticism, but also about agents and their actions: in 
particular, can reflection on the nature of agency be used to address moral scepticism? 
Within the contemporary literature, Christine Korsgaard is well-known for arguing 
that it can, while her approach is widely taken to be Kantian. At the same time, one 
prominent criticism of her position has been that is succumbs to difficulties famously 
highlighted by H. A. Prichard, that all attempts to answer the sceptic who asks why 
they should act morally end up undermining themselves, as they only succeed in 
treating moral actions as a means to non-moral ends – where this may also be taken to 
be a Kantian worry. After showing how Korsgaard makes herself seem vulnerable to 
this sort of objection by the way in which she presents her sceptical target, I want to 
then claim that Kant himself sees the sceptical challenge in a way that avoids 
Prichardian difficulties. I will then close by suggesting that if we read Korsgaard 
along these Kantian lines, we can understand her appeal to agency in a way that also 
avoids becoming a self-undermining response to moral scepticism, and thus put her 
debate with her critics in a different light. 
 
1. Korsgaard on moral scepticism and practical agency 
Korsgaard’s treatment of moral scepticism may be seen as part of a broader project in 
metaethics, which is to argue for constructivism and against realism, where her claim 
here is that the former has the advantage of being able to respond to moral scepticism 
in a way that the latter cannot. This scepticism comes about, she argues, when we are 
faced with what she calls ‘the normative question’, which arises when we encounter a 
moral demand, and find it to be problematic: 
 
 The normative question is a first-person question that arises for the moral 
agent who must actually do what morality says. When you want to know what 
a philosopher’s theory of normativity is, you must place yourself in the 
position of an agent on whom morality is making a difficult claim. You then 
ask the philosopher: must I really do this? Why must I do this? And his answer 
is his answer to the normative question.1  
 
Korsgaard then goes on to complain that realism does not and cannot answer this 
question. It does not answer it, because all it says is that you must act in a certain way 
                                                           
1 Christine M. Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity [hereafter SN], with G. A. Cohen, 
Raymond Geuss, Thomas Nagel, and Bernard Williams, edited by Onora O’Neill 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 16. 
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because it is the morally right thing to do, but the question precisely concerns what 
real force that consideration should have for you.2 And realism cannot answer the 
question, because on the realist account moral norms and values obtain independently 
of the agent, so the agent can always question their hold on him and wonder why he 
must act on them.3 
 Korsgaard argues, therefore, that we must turn from realism to a more 
constructivist form of metaethics, which instead of starting with reasons and then 
trying to show the agent why he must follow them, we start with agency and its 
conditions, and argue that moral norms and values can be constructed out of that in 
some way. Korsgaard claims that by proceeding in this manner, we can give the 
normative question an adequate answer, insofar as following the demands of morality 
and acknowledging its values can be shown to be constitutive of agency itself, so that 
‘the right of these concepts to give laws to us’4 will have been established. 
 How might this strategy work? The argument has a transcendental flavour: 
that is, the sceptic is shown that they cannot intelligibly reject the demand that 
morality makes, such as that they must act on the principle of universalizability, or 
must value the humanity of others, or whatever, because following that principle or 
acknowledging that value is a necessary condition of being an agent at all;5 from this 
perspective, then, just raising the normative question successfully resolves it, as a 
commitment to these norms and values is already presupposed in being the kind of 
agent who poses it in the first place, just as a commitment to the principle of non-
contradiction is necessary to the kind of mind who wonders if they should follow it.6 
This strategy, Korsgaard thinks, will successfully answer the moral sceptic in a way 
that the realist does not and cannot, where this is used by her as one of the central 
arguments in favour of her more constructivist approach.7 
 
2, Prichardian objections to Korsgaard 
This, I hope, is a reasonably faithful sketch of Korsgaard’s general position and its 
concerns. Turning now to some assessment of it, we must therefore consider whether 
it succeeds in its objective of answering ‘the normative question’ and so dealing with 
the moral sceptic, and of showing that the realist fails to do so in a way that reveals a 
                                                           
2 Cf. SN, p. 38: ‘…[a]ll [the realist] can say is that it is true that this is what you ought to 
do… But this answer appears to be off the mark. It addresses someone who has fallen into 
doubt about whether the action is really required by morality, not someone who has fallen 
into doubt about whether moral requirements really are normative’. 
3 Cf. Christine M. Korsgaard, The Constitution of Agency [hereafter CA] (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 7: ‘The rationalist account…cannot explain why 
rational principles necessarily motivate us. So long as bindingness or normativity is 
conceived of as a fact external to the will, and therefore external to the person, it seems 
possible to conceive of a person who is indifferent to it. But this throws doubt on whether 
such principles can be binding after all’. Cf. also ‘The Normativity of Instrumental Reason’, 
reprinted in CA, pp. 52-3.  
4 SN, p. 9.  
5 Cf. e.g. SN, pp. 228-9: ‘…I need to will universally in order to see my action as something 
which I do’; and p. 232: ‘…it is the claim to universality that gives me a will, that makes my 
will distinguishable from the operations of desires and impulses in me’. 
6 Cf. SN, p. 235 and CA, p. 7. 
7 Although his constructivism differs from Korsgaard’s, David Copp also argues that 
constructivism is better placed than realism to deal with sceptical issues: see ‘A Skeptical 
Challenge to Moral Non-Naturalism and a Defense of Constructivist Naturalism’, 
Philosophical Studies, 126 (2005), pp. 269-83. 
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serious weakness in the realist’s position. In making this assessment of Korsgaard’s 
case, one could of course criticize the details of Korsgaard’s argument; but I want to 
focus instead on a broader strategic challenge to her view, which (following H. A. 
Prichard’s celebrated article ‘Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?’, and related 
works of his)8 might be called the Prichardian challenge.9  
The challenge can be presented as follows: to take scepticism seriously in the 
way that Korsgaard does, is to assume that morality needs some extra-moral basis; 
however, to be moral is precisely to think the moral reasons one has to act are 
compelling in themselves, without any such basis for them being required by someone 
who is a genuine moral agent. So, the Prichardian thinks that all we can really do is 
remind the sceptic what his moral obligations are, and not get tempted into trying to 
offer further support for them in some way, as then the sceptic may end up acting 
morally, but will be doing so for the wrong reasons, so that we have ultimately failed 
in our efforts to deal with his scepticism.10 Thus, the realist will claim that the higher 
wisdom here is not to try to answer the sceptic, but to refuse to engage with him for 
these Prichardian reasons; as a result, it is argued, Korsgaard’s strategy of criticizing 
the realist for failing to answer the ‘normative question’ is fatally flawed.11 
That this is indeed a difficulty for Korsgaard’s approach may seem confirmed 
by passages such as the following: 
 
I believe that the answer [to the normative question] must appeal, in a deep 
way, to our sense of who we are, to our sense of our identity. As I have been 
emphasizing, morality can ask hard things of us, sometimes that we should be 
prepared to sacrifice our lives in its name. This places a demanding condition 
on a successful answer to the normative question: it must show that sometimes 
doing the wrong thing is as bad or worse than death. And for most human 
beings on most occasions, the only thing that could be as bad or worse than 
death is something that for us amounts to death – not being ourselves any 
more… If moral claims are ever worth dying for, then violating them must be, 
in a similar way, worse than death. And this means that they must issue in a 
deep way from our sense of who we are.12 
 
In the light of passages such as these, we might interpret Korsgaard as follows: 
Morality asks us to act against our immediate interests on many occasions, and thus 
the moral sceptic might well ask why he should be at all motivated to act as morality 
demands, and thus why he should consider morality as giving him any reason to act. 
In response, it seems, Korsgaard sets out to show that we cannot act immorally 
                                                           
8 See H. A. Prichard, Moral Writings, edited by Jim MacAdam (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2002). 
9 Korsgaard herself discusses Prichard’s position in SN: cf. pp. 38-9, pp. 42-44, pp. 60-1. 
10 Cf. John McDowell, ‘Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?’, reprinted in his 
Mind, Value, and Reality (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998), pp. 77-94, p. 
86: ‘The question “Why should I conform to the dictates of morality?” is most naturally 
understood as asking for an extra-moral motivation that will be gratified by virtuous 
behaviour. So understood, the question has no answer. What may happen is that someone is 
brought to see things as a virtuous person does, and so stops feeling the need to ask it’. 
11 Cf. Gerry Cohen’s response to Korsgaard, where he argues that once she allows the sceptic 
to characterize the problem in the way she does, any prospect of answering him is lost: see 
SN, pp. 178-183. 
12 SN, pp. 17-18. 
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without undermining our agency, which the sceptic presumably wants to preserve. In 
the end, then, the sceptic can be brought to see that she should not ‘experience moral 
obligation as something alien to her innermost self or her heart’s desire’,13 so that a 
reason for the moral action can be given in terms that will convince her to be moral.  
 It is precisely this appeal to the apparent interest the agent has and must have 
in acting morally, however, that has alarmed those who follow Prichard in thinking 
that to link morality to our interests in this way is to distort what is required, which is 
that the moral agent should act morally simply because he or she sees what is asked of 
them. So, for example, Nagel has objected that Korsgaard’s approach is in danger of 
‘cheapening the motive’ of moral action, and comes close to being an ‘egoist answer 
to egoism’,14 while Larmore is critical of ‘Kantians [who]…trace our moral concern 
for another back to what they regard as our supreme interest – namely, the affirmation 
of our own rational freedom. Recognizing the moral point of view for what it is really 
means, in contrast, learning to see the reason to do well by others as a reason that 
speaks for itself’.15 Similarly, Watkins and Fitzpatrick have raised the following 
worry from a realist perspective: 
 
 What is wrong with enslaving someone, for example, seems to be something 
straightforwardly and simply about her, given what she is – the dignity that 
belongs to her as a rational being. To cash out the wrongness of such an action 
and its normative force for me in a way that requires a detour through a story 
about what I have to do in order to exercise my will at all seems like a move in 
precisely the wrong direction. It does not seem true to ordinary moral 
experience, which certainly does not represent other people’s value and its 
significance for us as deriving from commitments bound up with the exercise 
of our own wills under certain generic constraints inherent in the nature of 
willing.16 
 
Thus, from this perspective, in raising the normative question Korsgaard is in fact said 
to play into the hands of the sceptic, and so to make precisely the mistake Prichard 
accused moral philosophy in general of making. 
  
                                                           
13 SN, p. 240.  
14 SN, p. 206. Korsgaard responds to Nagel’s worry in SN, pp. 246-51. 
15 Charles Larmore, The Autonomy of Morality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2008), p. 115. Larmore is spirited in his defence of Prichard’s approach at several points in 
the book, and critical of what he sees as Korsgaard’s failure to take Prichard’s position 
sufficiently seriously: see e.g. pp. 90-1, p. 113. 
16 Eric Watkins and William Fitzpatrick, ‘O’Neill and Korsgaard on the Construction of 
Normativity’, The Journal of Value Inquiry, 36 (2002), pp. 349-67, p. 361. Cf. also David 
Enoch, ‘Agency, Shmagency: Why Normativity Won’t Come from What is Constitutive of 
Action’, Philosophical Review, 115 (2006), pp. 169-98, where I think Enoch intends to strike 
a Pritchardian note on p. 180, where he remarks that Korsgaard will end up distorting things 
is she tries to use the fact that adopting certain principles and values is constitutive of agency 
as a way of getting the sceptic to be moral: ‘However strong or weak the reasons that apply to 
[the sceptic] and require that he be moral, surely they do not become stronger when he 
realizes that unless he complies with morality his bodily movements will not be adequately 
described as actions’ – where I take it that Enoch’s point is that if the sceptic came to think 
they were stronger on this basis, he would then see a reason to act morally, but not in a way 
that would make his action genuinely moral, so that Korsgaard’s strategy here is self-
defeating. 
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3. Kant and moral scepticism: Sections I and II of the ‘Groundwork’ 
I now want to turn to Kant, and consider how far the issues discussed above turn out 
to apply to him, and if therefore falls into the same Prichardian trap as Korsgaard 
seems to do. My strategy will be to argue that while Kant was indeed deeply 
concerned with a certain type of moral scepticism, this differs from the type discussed 
above, and so does not lead him to make the mistake of trying to deal with a question 
that is better left set aside. To keep the discussion within reasonable bounds, I will 
mainly focus on Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. My claim will be 
that in the first two sections of the Groundwork, the issue of scepticism of any sort 
hardly arises at all, and that while an important sceptical threat is discussed and dealt 
with in the third section, this is a threat of a distinctively different kind. 
In the Preface and first two sections of the Groundwork, it is perhaps scarcely 
surprising that Kant does not take up any serious sceptical challenge. For, in this part 
of the work, the main task Kant sets himself is to identify ‘the supreme principle of 
morality’, where he does so by taking our commonly shared moral conceptions for 
granted (for example, about the good will, duty, the imperatival nature of morality, 
and certain moral cases), and attempting to derive the Formula of Universal Law as 
the supreme moral principle from them by a process of analysis. In these sections, 
therefore, Kant seems more than happy to accept that we have a good grasp of 
morality without any need for philosophy, where he does not expect us to find the 
Formula of Universal Law to be revisionary of that grasp in any way – indeed, if it 
were, he would allow that it would be an objection to his claim that it constitutes the 
supreme principle that he is looking for here. Thus, Kant willingly accepts that in 
arriving at the Formula of Universal law, he is not teaching ‘the moral cognition of 
common reason’ anything new, but simply making it ‘attentive to its own principles’: 
‘there is, accordingly, no need of science and philosophy to know what one has to do 
in order to be honest and good, and even wise and virtuous’.17 Kant therefore seems to 
take for granted that our moral practices are in good order and in no need of defence 
or justification, and that philosophy can proceed by simply reflecting on them, to 
bring out the fundamental moral principle on which they rely. Given this kind of 
approach, it is scarcely surprising that sceptical challenges have little place. 
Now, Kant is sensitive to a worry that might seem to follow: namely, that if 
our ordinary moral thinking really is in such good order, and if philosophy must base 
itself on this thinking, what is the point in engaging with the effort of doing 
philosophy here at all – particularly, as he admits, when our ordinary thinking is quite 
adept at a pretty high level of reflection on moral matters, while philosophizing might 
lead it astray, and so make matters worse.18 Kant thinks he has a response to this 
worry – but again, it is a response that so far gives no anti-sceptical role to his 
                                                           
17 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Akademie edition 4:404; 
translated by Mary J. Gregor in Immanuel Kant, Practical Philosophy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 58 [hereafter GMM, where the Akademie reference is 
followed by the reference to the Gregor translation]. For similar remarks, see 4:412, p. 66, 
where Kant comments that ‘common moral appraisal’ is ‘very worthy of respect’; and 
Critique of Practical Reason [hereafter CPrR], translated by Mary J. Gregor in Practical 
Philosophy, 5:8note, p. 153: ‘[W]ho would even want to introduce a new principle of all 
morality and, as it were, first invent it? Just as if, before him, the world had been ignorant of 
what duty is or in thoroughgoing error about it’.  
18 Cf. GMM 4:404, p. 59: ‘…philosopher, though he cannot have any other principle that that 
of common understanding, can easily confuse his judgment by a mass of considerations 
foreign and irrelevant to the matter and deflect it from the straight course’. 
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philosophical project. For, the value Kant places on philosophy here is that by 
arriving at the supreme principle of morality, philosophy can lead us to be better 
moral agents by making it harder for us succumb to the ‘natural dialectic’ whereby we 
deceive ourselves on moral matters;19 its value does not lie in making it easier to 
answer those who see no reason to be moral. 
 It may seem, however, that Kant gets closer to addressing a genuine 
scepticism about morality at he start of Section II, where he raises the spectre of 
‘those who ridicule all morality as the mere phantom of a human imagination 
overstepping itself through self-conceit’.20 The sceptic Kant is considering here makes 
much of the frailties Kant has already noted, and who claims that we can therefore 
never be sure that anyone in fact acts for anything other than self-interest; they then 
try to bring morality into doubt by pointing to this fact. Kant may therefore seem to 
getting closer here to an engagement with the moral sceptic. 
 However, although Kant is indeed bringing in a reference to the sceptical 
position here, I do not believe that he is taking it seriously in its own right, or setting 
out to show how it can be refuted as such; rather, he is using it as a means to criticize 
an empirical approach to moral philosophy, which is his main target. For, Kant holds 
that the evidence of human moral weakness, and the consequent difficulty of finding 
clear examples of action done from duty and with no regard for the ‘dear self’21 can 
only lead to scepticism about morality if one takes the content of morality to be 
something we must leave to our experience to determine, by generating this from 
examples of moral behaviour; for then, of course, if we are truly unable to find any 
such examples, we could not conduct our investigation into morality, and we might 
regard all moral principles as suspect. But, of course, Kant thinks anyone who is 
drawn to this conclusion has simply adopted a mistaken view of the nature of our 
moral principles, which are known a priori rather than being based on examples – and 
indeed, must be if we are to treat the moral law as valid for all rational agents, and to 
explain how we could come up with any moral assessment of the examples of moral 
action in the first place.22 Far from taking scepticism here as a serious threat, 
therefore, Kant uses the possibly sceptical consequences of any empirical approach in 
ethics as a reductio of that position. 
 It would seem from the first two sections of the Groundwork, therefore, that 
there is no real evidence to suggest that Kant is seriously troubled by the sort of 
scepticism identified by Korsgaard. Rather than setting out to refute such scepticism, 
Kant merely takes the contribution of his enterprise thus far to lie in perhaps enabling 
us to be better moral beings, in offering us a kind of pure philosophical approach to 
ethics that will help us guard against sophistry and self-deception in our moral 
conduct, while its a priori nature can also help us argue that the lack of clear examples 
of moral behaviour is no threat to thinking about morality – for example, we can still 
                                                           
19 GMM, 4:405, p. 59. For further discussion of this aspect of Kant’s position, see Dieter 
Henrich, ‘The Concept of Moral Insight into Kant’s Doctrine of the Fact of Reason’, in Dieter 
Henrich, The Unity of Reason: Essays on Kant’s Philosophy, edited by Richard Velkley 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994), pp. 55-87, and Paul Guyer, ‘The 
Strategy of Kant’s Groundwork’, in his Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 207-31. 
20 GMM, 4:407, p. 62. Cf. David Copp, Morality, Normativity, and Society (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001), p. 5, where Copp cites this passage as evidence of Kant’s 
engagement with the moral sceptic. 
21 GMM 4:407, p. 62. 
22 GMM 4:408-9, pp. 62-3. 
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see how friends are required to be sincere with one another, even if we are not certain 
that anyone has managed to be motivated solely by friendship and not self-interest.23 
Much like Aristotle, therefore, Kant may be read up to this point as working within a 
pre-existing moral framework, rather than as trying to answer someone challenging it 
from the outside and asking why they should adopt it,24 where this is the sort of 
project that can lead to the kind of problems raised by the Prichardian. 
 
3. Kant and moral scepticism: Section III of the ‘Groundwork’ 
However, it could now be said, we have so far only discussed Sections I and II of the 
Groundwork, which adopt the analytical approach of starting with our common moral 
cognition, and so may indeed work in this ‘internal’ fashion; but (the objection runs) 
Kant’s approach is very different in Section III, with very different results. Moreover, 
it can be argued, this division in the structure of the Groundwork between the first 
two sections and the last corresponds to the two-fold task that Kant has set himself in 
the Preface, of not only searching for or identifying the supreme principle of morality 
(which he claims to have achieved through Sections I and II), but also establishing it, 
or making it good.25 In addition, he speaks here in terms of offering a ‘deduction’, 
which as we know from the first Critique is something he associates with justificatory 
issues. And, finally, it can be pointed out that there are several points in Sections I and 
II where Kant raises what seem like sceptical concerns about morality and its 
principles, explicitly saying that he will postpone such issues until he gets to Section 
III: so the fact that Kant has not focused on answering the sceptic in the previous parts 
of the Groundwork can hardly be taken as evidence that he did not take the sceptic 
seriously, or wanted to leave sceptical worries on one side. 
 Now, this is all indeed true. So, Kant does indeed characterize his approach in 
Section III as synthetic rather than analytic; he does give the Groundwork a two-fold 
task; he does speak of offering a deduction; and he does hint at deeper sceptical 
worries in Section I and II that he promises to return to, where for example he speaks 
of taking it for granted at this stage that there are practical propositions which 
command categorically, without having proved that there really are any such 
propositions.26 My suggestion now will be, however, that Kant takes this turn in 
Section III not because he is seeking to address here the sort of sceptic who sees no 
reason to be moral, but rather a scepticism that has a very different basis, and which 
can thus be addressed without leading to the kind of Prichardian concerns raised 
above.  
 To see how Kant’s engagement with moral scepticism is distinctive in this 
way, we must appreciate the transcendental character of that scepticism, where this 
                                                           
23 Cf. GMM, 4:408, p. 62. 
24 Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1095b1-13. John McDowell, in particular, has 
emphasized how it is a mistake to see Aristotle as attempting to offer a ‘grounding’ for ethics: 
see the papers on Aristotle reprinted in his Mind, Value, and Reality. 
25 Cf. GMM, 4:392, p. 47: ‘The present groundwork is, however, nothing more than the search 
for [Aufsuchung] and establishment [Festsetzung] of the supreme principle of morality’. Cf. 
also CPrR 5:8, p. 143, where Kant says that the Critique ‘presupposes, indeed, the 
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, but only insofar as this constitutes preliminary 
acquaintance with the principle of duty and provides and justifies a determinate formula of it 
[und eine bestimmte Formel derselben angibt und rechtfertigt]’. 
26 See GMM 4:431, p. 82, and 4:425, p. 76. 
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involves a different kind of puzzlement about morality than any so far discussed.27 
Whereas the earlier moral sceptic may be characterized as standing ‘outside’ morality 
and as asking why they should enter into it at all, Kant’s sceptic is more like someone 
who is already inside the moral life but who nonetheless comes to find it problematic 
from within, and so questions it as a result – where they are not looking for reasons to 
be moral, but ways of understanding how morality is even possible. What gives rise to 
this transcendental doubt, Kant thinks, is the way in which morality relates to us as 
human beings, where for us it takes the form of duties that are obligatory or binding 
in a particular way, where it is this obligatoriness that raises worries that can lead to 
deep sceptical concerns about the very possibility of morality. Thus, the issue here is 
whether morality can be made sense of by those already living the moral life, not 
whether those outside that life can be persuaded into it. 
 One of the crucial features of Kant’s discussion of morality is the contrast he 
draws between us as moral beings, and the moral life of those with ‘holy wills’.28 The 
difference, Kant argues, is that whereas for us, morality takes the form of imperatives 
which tell us what we must do, for holy wills this is not the case: for such wills, Kant 
claims, there is no imperatival force to morality. And because it is an essential feature 
of morality for us that it involves obligatoriness, Kant thinks that problematic issues 
are raised here that do not arise for holy wills.  
 The first, and perhaps most obvious, concerns freedom. For, taking the 
principle of ‘ought implies can’,29 and allowing that morality is obligatory for us, then 
for morality to be anything more than a ‘chimera’,30 we must have freedom. This 
means, therefore, that a metaphysical basis for moral scepticism can come from a 
position that denies that we have any such freedom. Indeed, Kant faced a concrete 
example of such scepticism in the figure of Johann Henrich Schulz, whose work 
Attempt at an Introduction to the Doctrine of Morals was reviewed by Kant in 1783, a 
couple of years prior to the publication of the Groundwork. In his book, Schulz had 
denied the existence of free will, and thus (as far as Kant was concerned, at least) 
adopted a ‘general fatalism which…turns all human conduct into a mere puppet show 
and thereby does away altogether with the concept of obligation’,31 and thus with all 
morality. Here, then, is one form of scepticism about morality that has a metaphysical 
basis, as a threat to the very possibility of morality.  
 A second metaphysical issue that arises out of the obligatory nature of 
morality for us as humans, concerns a puzzlement about that obligatoriness as such, 
rather any doubts one might feel about the freedom that it requires as a condition. 
What makes that obligatoriness problematic, Kant thinks, is the peculiar kind of 
necessity that the obligations of morality claim for themselves, where this is 
                                                           
27 It can be hard to see what is distinctive about such puzzlement. For general accounts to 
make this clear that I have found helpful, see James Conant, ‘Varieties of Skepticism’, in 
Denis McManus (ed.), Wittgenstein and Scepticism (London: Routledge, 2004), pp. 97-136; 
and Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explorations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), pp. 
8-11. 
28 See, for example, GMM, 4:439, p. 88. 
29 For further discussion of Kant’s attitude to this principle, see my paper ‘Does “Ought” 
Imply “Can”? And Did Kant Think It Does?’, Utilitas, 16 (2004), pp. 42-61. 
30 Cf. GMM, 4:445, p. 93. 
31 Immanuel Kant, ‘Review of Schulz’s Attempt at an Introduction to a Doctrine of Morals 
for all Human Beings Regardless of Different Religions’, translated by Mary Gregor in 
Immanuel Kant, Practical Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 8:13, 
p. 9. 
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problematic not because of issues to do with our motivation or clashes with other 
concerns, but because it is hard to see what makes a necessity of this kind possible. 
Just as in the theoretical case, where the problematic nature of the necessity claimed 
by metaphysicians for their principles can be shown through bringing out the 
synthetic a priori nature of such claims, where in turn that synthetic a priority is 
profoundly puzzling, so Kant thinks that the problematic nature of the necessity 
claimed by morality can be show through bringing out the synthetic a priori nature of 
what it says we must do, in the form of categorical imperatives. It is this issue, 
therefore, that Kant flags in Section II when he first introduces these imperatives as 
characteristic of morality, but where he postpones any resolution of it to Section III,32 
in such a way as to put to rest any scepticism about morality based around it, from 
those who think that perhaps there just are no such imperatives of this problematic 
and mysterious kind, so that Kant is misguided in Section II in deriving any supreme 
principle of morality from reflection upon them. 
 In Section II, therefore, Kant sets up the transcendental or ‘how possible?’ 
question in the practical case, by contrasting moral imperatives which are categorical, 
and imperatives of skill or prudence, which are hypothetical. Both types involve a 
necessity for both tell us that there is something we must do; but in the former case, 
Kant thinks that the necessity is problematic in a way that in the latter case it is not. 
This is not because the hypothetical imperatives asks us to do something that is in line 
with our interests, and the categorical imperatives do not, so it is puzzling how we can 
be motivated to follow the categorical imperatives of morality, or what could 
(therefore) make such imperatives rational.33 The difficulty Kant is interested in, I 
think, is deeper than this: namely, how can it be that there is anything I must do, how 
is such prescriptivity or obligatoriness possible? As Kant puts it: ‘This question does 
not inquire how the performance of the action that the imperative commands can be 
thought, but only how the necessitation of the will, which the imperative expresses in 
the problem, can be thought [or conceived, or made sense of: gedacht]’.34 Kant thinks 
this question can be answered easily enough in the case of hypothetical imperatives, 
because there is an analytic relation of containment35 here: if I want to be a pianist, I 
must practice, because I cannot be a pianist otherwise, so I am necessarily constrained 
in this way, by the end I have set myself; and while Kant thinks things are a bit more 
complicated when it comes to imperatives of prudence, this is not because the 
connection is any less analytic in theory, but just because it is harder in practice to 
know about what the necessary means to happiness actually are.36 In these cases, 
therefore, it is easy to see how certain actions can come to be represented as necessary 
for me to do. The problem, however, in the case of the necessity involved in morality, 
is that this necessity cannot be accounted for analytically as part of the means/end 
                                                           
32 Cf. GMM, 4:419-20, p. 72. 
33 This is perhaps the standard view, expressed for example by Hill when he writes: ‘…Kant 
held the Hypothetical Imperative to be easier to follow and to justify than the Categorical 
Imperative. The Categorical Imperative often demands the sacrifice of self-interest whereas 
the Hypothetical Imperative, typically, is in the service of long-term interest. The 
Hypothetical Imperative rarely calls for the sort of internal struggle that the Categorical 
Imperative demands’ (Thomas E. Hill, Dignity and Practical Reason in Kant’s Moral Theory 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), p. 32). 
34 GMM, 4:417, pp. 69-70, my emphasis. 
35 Cf. GMM, 4:417, p. 70, my emphasis: ‘…the imperative extracts the concept of actions 
necessary to this end merely from the concept of a volition of this end’. 
36 Cf. GMM, 4:417-9, pp. 69-71. 
 10 
relation, because this relation makes the ‘must’ conditional on having something as an 
end, whereas the moral ‘must’ is unconditional and inescapable and so stronger than 
this;37 but then, we lose the way of accounting for the ‘must’ straightforwardly in 
analytic terms, as there is now no end in which it can be contained as the required 
means. If the ‘must’ in ‘you must not tell lies’ is not to be explained analytically, 
therefore, we are left with the question in the moral case of explaining it some other 
way, which seems much more challenging, and can leave us wondering how there can 
be any such necessity – just as in the case of metaphysical necessity, we can be left 
wondering how it can be the case that every event must have a cause. 
 On this approach, therefore, there is a rather precise parallel between how 
Kant sees scepticism arising in the practical case, and in the theoretical one, where 
both hinge on the question of how necessity of a certain kind is possible. Thus, as is 
well known, Kant holds that Hume became a sceptic about causality because he saw 
on the one had that the necessary relation between events and their causes cannot be 
accounted for analytically and thus thought of as akin to logical necessity, but on the 
other hand did not see how necessity could obtain otherwise, as anything other than a 
logical relation. Hume’s scepticism is this ‘consequent’ rather than ‘antecedent’,38 
based on an apparently well-founded puzzlement concerning the necessity at issue. 
Likewise, I would argue, Kant saw moral scepticism arising in a similar manner, 
based on an inability to see how there could even be such a thing as a moral ‘must’, 
once the peculiar nature of that ‘must’ is made clear. And, we cannot console 
ourselves with the thought that we don’t really need to answer that question in order 
to keep morality safe, by thinking that even if we don’t know how it is possible, we 
know at least that in fact agents are so bound, because we can see in experience that 
people’s behaviour is governed in this way by nothing but a sense of duty: for, Kant 
thinks, when it comes to it, this is never really clear, given the murky nature of what 
really motivates people.39 Thus, while as a result of Sections I and II of the 
Groundwork, we might agree with Kant about what the supreme principle of morality 
is, the question still remains how the obligatory force we seem to feel in association 
with this principle is to be understood and explained, given that no analytic 
means/end account is open to us; and the worry is, that if no adequate explanation is 
forthcoming, we will be led to give up the notion of duty as a bad job (much as Hume 
came to have his sceptical doubts concerning causality), thereby bringing down the 
whole deontological conception of morality Kant has developed in Sections I and II, 
and which he thinks is the conception we all share, so that in the end, we would lose 
our grip on morality altogether. Thus, just as Kant raises the ‘how possible?’ question 
in relation to the problem of synthetic a priori knowledge in his theoretical 
philosophy, so too he raises it in relation to the problem of synthetic a priori practical 
                                                           
37 Cf. GMM, 4:420, p. 72: ‘[T]he categorical imperative alone has the tenor of a practical law; 
all the others can indeed be called principles of the will but not laws, since what it is 
necessary to do merely for achieving a discretionary purpose can be regarded as in itself 
contingent and we can always be released from the precept if we give up the purpose; on the 
contrary, the unconditional command leaves the will no discretion with respect to the 
opposite, so that it alone brings with it that necessity which we require of a law’. 
38 Cf. David Hume Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the 
Principles of Morals, 3rd edition, edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge, revised by P. H. Nidditch 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 
Section XII, Parts I and II, pp. 149-60. 
39 Cf. Kant, GMM, 4:419, pp. 71-2. 
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propositions in his practical philosophy, where those propositions are made synthetic 
because they express categorical rather than hypothetical imperatives. 
 Finally, Kant’s conception of the obligatoriness raises a transcendental 
question concern our moral psychology. For, even assuming that we are free, there is 
a question about how our psychological structure could work in the way that seems to 
be required by morality, as Kant conceives it. The difficulty is in seeing how it can be 
that on the one hand moral action consists in following duty and not inclination, while 
on the other hand desire and inclination seem to be fundamental to our behaviour as 
agents – so the question is, how is moral action so much as possible for us? The 
sceptic Kant is envisaging here is looking for an explanation of how moral agency is 
possible at all, not a reason to be a moral agent. As Kant says, ‘I am willing to admit 
that no interest impels me to [follow the principle of universalisability], for that would 
not give a categorical imperative; but I must still necessarily take an interest in it’ if 
we are to understand how I come to act at all, where what we therefore need is 
‘insight into how this comes about’.40 
 We have seen, therefore, that for Kant there are three important and 
interrelated ways in which a kind of transcendental puzzlement about morality can 
arise, in such a way that if left unchecked, could lead one to feel that morality is a 
‘chimera’ for us, however unproblematic it may be for ‘holy wills’ who are clearly 
free, under no peculiar moral ‘oughts’, and possessed of a different moral 
psychology.41 And, I would claim, it is Kant’s engagement with these bases for moral 
scepticism which form the substance of Section III of the Groundwork, as we can now 
briefly set out. In all cases, as we shall see, Kant thinks it is vital to make appeal to 
aspects of his transcendental idealism, as the only way to settle the puzzlement about 
morality as it arises in these areas. 
 As is well known, Kant’s response to the worry about freedom is to use his 
transcendental idealism to distinguish between appearances and things-in-themselves, 
and thus between a causally ordered realm of nature and a non-causal realm, in which 
the freedom of the moral subject can be preserved. This allows Kant to show how the 
freedom required to make sense of morality might be possible, while arguing that the 
fact we feel under moral obligations gives us a practical ground on which to think it is 
actual, though this can never be established as certain in a theoretical manner as all 
such knowledge concerning things-in-themselves is denied us.42 
                                                           
40 Kant, GMM, 4:449, p. 96.  
41 Jens Timmermann has also emphasized how it is the issue of explanation that is at the 
centre of Kant’s engagement with scepticism, rather than the challenge raised by the sceptic 
who is looking for reasons to be moral. Cf. Jens Timmermann, Kant’s ‘Groundwork of the 
Metaphysics of Morals’: A Commentary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 
129-30, where Timmermann characterizes the question Kant is addressing as one raised by 
‘that of a morally decent person whose trust in the supreme authority of ethical commands is 
challenged by the elusiveness of their source as well as the obvious threat of natural 
determinism’, rather than that raised by ‘a radical moral sceptic who, say in the face of robust 
self-regarding interest, asks for a normative reason why he should take up the moral point of 
view at all’.  
42 Cf. Kant, GMM, 4:450-3, pp. 98-100. Although I cannot go into the details here, this is one 
place where Kant’s strategy changes somewhat between the Groundwork and the Critique of 
Practical Reason, where I would argue that in the former Kant uses an appeal to 
transcendental idealism to argue for the division between appearances and things-in-
themselves on which his argument for freedom there is presented as depending, whereas in 
the latter Kant thinks he can place enough weight on an appeal to our moral commitments, 
and can argue from there to our freedom – a strategy that Kant worried in the Groundwork 
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 Kant can also use the dualistic picture of the subject that comes with 
transcendental idealism to help him explain the peculiar obligatoriness of morality, 
and so resolve the question of how categorical imperatives are possible. As we have 
already mentioned, this question only arises from a human perspective, as it is a 
feature of how morality presents itself to us, not to holy wills. Kant then uses this very 
fact to provide himself with a solution to the puzzle: for, just as it is because we have 
desires and inclinations that morality involves imperatives for us, so he argues that 
this division within the self explains that very obligatoriness, in so far as it is a kind of 
projection of the fact that the subject’s desires set themselves against the moral course 
of action, and so make the latter seem to us to be something to which we are obliged, 
in a way that does not and cannot happen for the holy will. At the same time, 
transcendental idealism gives us a framework in which this dualistic picture of the 
self, and how it operates, in such as away as to make the moral ‘ought’ explicable: 
 
 And so categorical imperatives are possible by this: that the idea of freedom 
makes me a member of an intelligible world and consequently, if I were only 
this, all my actions would always be in conformity with the autonomy of the 
will; but since at the same time I intuit myself as a member of the world of 
sense, they ought to be in conformity with it; and this categorical ought 
represents a synthetic proposition a priori, since to my will affected by 
sensible desires there is added the idea of the same will but belonging to the 
world of the understanding – a will pure and practical of itself, which contains 
the supreme condition, in accordance with reason, of the former will.43 
 
This, then, is Kant’s distinctive answer to the question of obligatoriness that has 
shaped the debate in the history of ethics between natural law theorists and 
voluntarists. Kant can be seen as steering a path between both traditions: like the 
natural law theorists, he treats the rightness of morality in a realist manner, but like 
the voluntarists he treats the obligatoriness of what is right as arising out of the nature 
of our will with its dualistic structure; and on the other hand, the will that makes 
morality obligatory is ours and not an external source of reward or punishment like 
God, while what is thereby made obligatory is fixed by what is right, so that this 
voluntarism is constrained and does not go all the way down to the content of the 
moral law itself. In a slogan, therefore, we might say that Kant combined anti-realism 
about obligatoriness, with realism about that which is obligatory and thus with realism 
about the right.44 Once again, therefore, Kant can claim to have offered an answer to 
someone who questions morality because they just do not see how it can get to have 
its peculiarly imperatival nature.  
 Finally, we can also see how Kant uses the framework he has established in 
Section III of the Groundwork to resolve the third source of moral scepticism, which 
questions the intelligibility of the kind of psychological account that seems required 
for moral action to be possible. Here, Kant’s strategy is to admit that there is indeed 
                                                           
might be question begging (cf. GMM, 4:450, pp. 97-8), but which in the second Critique he 
thinks is adequate for what is required (where for our purposes, it is again notable that it 
would clearly not be adequate against a sceptic who just did not recognize any moral 
commitments as valid in the first place). 
43 Kant, GMM, 4:454, pp. 100-101. 
44 For further discussion of these issues, see my paper ‘Kant, Moral Obligation, and the Holy 
Will’, in Sorin Baiasu and Mark Timmons (eds), Kant’s Practical Philosophy (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011).  
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something fundamentally puzzling here, but in a way that we should not feel pushes 
into anything like moral scepticism: for the puzzlement is in an area where we have 
good reason to acknowledge that we can only have a limited understanding of such 
matters, so the fact that we find the issue hard to grasp should not be taken as any 
reason to doubt the possibility of the phenomenon in question. The difficulty arises, 
Kant thinks, because on the one hand morality requires that we act out of duty and not 
inclination, while on the other hand as human agents we are caused to act through our 
feelings, so that the thought of something as a duty or what is right for us to do must 
bring about such feelings of pleasure in us; but we then become puzzled about this, 
because the causal relation here is highly problematic and mysterious-seeming, 
because what brings about the feeling of pleasure is not anything empirical, so we 
assume that it could only come about if our action is directed at our happiness, but 
where this would render true moral action impossible on the account we have given of 
what this must involve. But, Kant argues, rather than becoming dubious about the 
possibility of moral action on this score, we should recognize that the problem just 
reflects out general lack of understanding of the relation between the phenomenal and 
noumenal realms, so that while no positive solution to the puzzle can be given, there 
is no reason to jump to a purely hedonistic model of human action, as here we have a 
‘blind spot’ that leaves room for the account we need in order to allow for the 
possibility of the kind of picture of action as involving duty and not inclination that is 
implied by morality.45 
 However, though Kant uses one aspect of his transcendental idealism here to 
try to convince us that we must simply accept that the mechanisms of moral action 
will always remain mysterious to us in this way, he also uses another aspect of that 
idealism to explain why it is we feel such admiration for our capacity for moral 
agency, which again otherwise might seem mysterious in a way that could lead us to 
question the value we place upon that agency. The worry, then, is this: 
 
[I]f someone asked us why the universal validity of our maxims as a law must 
be the limiting conditions of our actions, and on what we base the worth we 
assign to this way of acting – a worth so great that there can be no higher 
interest anywhere – and asked us how it happens that a human being believes 
that only through this does he feel his personal worth, in comparison with 
which that of an agreeable or disagreeable condition is to be held as nothing, 
we could give him no satisfactory answer.46 
 
Here, it may seem, Kant comes closer than at any point so far in trying to answer the 
non-transcendental sceptic, who asks why they should ignore what is ‘agreeable or 
disagreeable’ to then in favour of acting morally, and thus questions the ‘validity and 
practical necessity of subjecting oneself’ to the moral principle.47 However, even 
here, I would argue, the dialectic is importantly different, as Kant is considering 
someone who already does value their status as a moral being above what is 
‘agreeable and disagreeable’ to them in this way, and who is just wondering ‘how it 
                                                           
45 Cf. Kant, GMM, 4:460, p. 106. Kant continues in a similar vein in the following 
paragraphs, concluding that given the limitations of our intellects, ‘we do not indeed 
comprehend the practical unconditional necessity of the moral imperative, but we 
nevertheless comprehend its incomprehensibility; and this is all that can fairly be required of a 
philosophy that strives in its principles to the very boundary of human reason’ (4:462, p. 108). 
46 Kant, GMM, 4:449-50, p. 97.  
47 Kant, GMM, 4:449, p. 97. 
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happens’ that this is the case – how can the value of being a moral agent be accounted 
for if not in the way in which it furthers my interest? 
 Now, Kant also uses his transcendental idealism and its dualistic conception of 
the self to provide an answer to this question, by arguing that the moral self is the 
authentic self, by virtue of its status as a member of the ‘intelligible world’; it must 
thus be given higher value in our eyes, in a way that enables our respect for ourselves 
and others to be explained, as well as the ‘contempt’ and ‘abhorrence’ we feel for 
ourselves when we fall short.48 As Kant famously argues, even the most ‘hardened 
scoundrel’ is sensitive to this distinction, and therefore wishes that he could be moral 
even if he can’t quite manage it.49 Kant thus offers an explanation for the admiration 
we feel for moral agency, and why we value it so highly, thus dispelling the apparent 
mystery here; but this is a value that will only be apparent to the agent who (even if a 
hardened scoundrel) has some sensitivity to the moral life, not to the agent who is 
asking to be brought into that life from the perspective of the egoist or amoralist. 
 It is not my purpose here to defend in detail the various answers Kant gives to 
the transcendental sceptic, who raises these ‘how possible?’ questions against 
morality, and to ask in particular whether Kant’s appeal to the framework of his 
transcendental idealism actually settles these questions in the way he would like; all I 
have tried to argue for is the distinctive nature of such questions within Kant’s 
philosophy. And as a result, I would also argue, Kant’s position is free of the dangers 
highlighted by Prichard and others, where it was claimed that the attempt to supply 
the sceptic with reasons to act ethically has the cost of seeming to distort the very 
moral phenomena that we are seeking to defend, and so of feeding the sceptical 
flames; for, nothing in the kind of scepticism that Kant takes seriously is likely to 
result in his response to that scepticism becoming self-defeating in this manner. 
 
4. Kant and Korsgaard 
We began this paper by considering Korsgaard’s constructivist criticism of realism, 
that it could not offer an adequate response to moral scepticism; and we also began by 
considering the realist’s Prichardian reply, namely that no such response is needed, as 
to offer one is to seek to give morality a non-moral grounding, in a way that 
immediately leads us astray. We also saw how Korsgaard might be read as falling into 
this Prichardian trap.  
Following our discussion of Kant, however it should be clear that this dialectic 
is too simple: for the example of Kant shows how sceptical problems can arise in a 
way that do not succumb to Prichardian concerns, as these arise from within morality. 
When it comes to Korsgaard, therefore, this opens up a way of reading her ‘normative 
question’ in a transcendental manner – that is, concerning doubts about morality 
raised by the need to understand how the moral demand is possible, how it can be 
adequately explained, where it is in offering a response to this question that the appeal 
to the conditions of agency may be said to lie. Understood in this way, Korsgaard 
could claim to be addressing a form of moral scepticism on the one hand, while 
avoiding the Prichardian challenge on the other, much as (we have argued) Kant 
himself manages to do. 
Now, there is no space to explore this possibility as an interpretation of 
Korsgaard in any detail here; the aim has simply been to open it up as a model, by 
drawing the comparison with Kant. Moreover, it also remains to be seen whether, 
                                                           
48 Cf. Kant, GMM, 4:426, p. 77. 
49 See Kant, GMM, 4:454-5, p. 101. 
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even understood in this manner, Korsgaard is right to think that constructivism is in a 
better position to resolve the ‘normative question’ than the realist: for, of course, the 
constructivist’s transcendental puzzlement has to be properly motivated, and it may 
be that the realist can claim that some of the puzzlement here is not, but can easily be 
set aside as spurious. This, again, cannot be considered fully here. It is to be hoped, 
however, that by considering the interpretation we have offered of Kant, we have also 
shed light on a strategy Korsgaard can also adopt in answering her Prichardian critics 
concerning the ‘normative question’ and thus how her appeal to agency might come 
to answer it – that is, by treating it as a transcendental question, of the sort that might 
lead to moral scepticism even in the best of us, if it cannot be resolved.50  
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50 I am grateful to those who commented on this paper at the Ratio conference at which it was 
first delivered, and also those who heard it as Royal Institute of Philosophy lecture at the 
University of York – where I am particularly grateful for discussions with Christian Piller on 
that occasion and subsequently. I would also like to thank Max de Gaynesford for his kind 
invitation to contribute to the Ratio conference and to this collection. 
